Jim Copeland: My name is Jim Copeland, and it's James Edwin Copeland Junior formally, but everybody who knows me would refer to me as Jim. I'm retired CEO of Deloitte in the US and Global. Held the two positions simultaneously, and I spent thirty-seven years with that firm. As I mentioned to you earlier, I'm a little bit uncomfortable with the notion of focusing on singular leadership. I think, particular in the environment that I grew up in leadership is very much a team sport, and in a professional services firm you have relatively small teams of people who serve clients. The leaders in those teams are the most basic element of leadership in the organization.

When you look at it broadly, with a hundred thousand people you literally must have thousands of people that are leading, more or less in the same direction if you're going to accomplish anything strategically. The notion of giving all the credit or all the blame to a single leader in an organization, at least in a professional service environment, I think is ludicrous, but there is a role for leadership that people talk about the tone at the top. I would that's a necessary but insufficient condition for creating a tone and an organization, or a culture in an organization. I think the real test of that is the tone at the bottom of the organization.

You could have Saint Peter as the CEO of your organization unless the people in the firm would buy into his values, and into his aspirations for the organization you wouldn't have the culture that you're looking for. Your notion of accountable leadership has a lot of appeal to me, and probably because of the environment that I grew up in professionally. Professional service firms are by nature a model of accountability, because they by and large are partnerships. The leaders, in general, and certainly at Deloitte are elected by the partners, and so you have to be accountable to that electorate every year.

I know at Deloitte we had a group of partners every year that would be asked to go out and interview as many of the partners as they could, and literally would do hundreds of interviews. They would come back with what the partners have said about the leadership of the firm. Then they would sit down with you for about two miserable days telling you all of the things that the partners had said about your performance over the past year. It was enormously frustrating, because they didn't try to harmonize what they heard. You would have one partner saying, "Jim's spending too much of our money investing in the long term," and other people would say exactly the opposite. They would say, "Jim's not investing enough in the long term future of the firm."

You would sit there and look for more feedback or some kind of reconciliation of those views, and they would just stare back at you. It was frustrating in that sense, but it was really good input to get. It was valuable input, because you did know that there were people out there with both of those points of view. The message that that communicated about accountability was just incredible. You were working for them, and they had expectations of you, and they expected you to perform up to those expectations, and that there was no way to escape that being right to front of your mind when you had to go through that every year. From an accountability standpoint I was fascinated by the organization that you're leading, and the subject and direction that you're following in your research.

Speaker 2: How'd you find yourself arriving at Deloitte? After thirty-seven years ago or more you arrived.

Jim Copeland: Yeah, the lead up to all of that ... I grew up in a very small rural town Norcross, Georgia which now is of course a suburb of Atlanta, but at the time it was dirt roads and small schools, and the phone book had about eight pages in it. It was about four hundred people in the town in total, and I was born into a family with three children. I had a wonderful mother and dad. My father was a world class athlete, obviously the genes skipped a generation, but he was a wonderful athlete. His sense of competitiveness permeated the family. I know I finished, I think it was third in the state in the half mile, and that was known as losing. It was a pretty competitive environment to grow up in.

When I was about four I contracted rheumatic fever and heart disease, and so I was in a wheelchair for three years I guess, and parents were told I was going to die, I was told I was going to die. God had other plans, and I came out the other end pretty much physically diminished, but fortunately I grew up in a ... As I said in a small town with small schools, and so I was able to play sports, and I was able to ... If you could stand up and chew chewing gum you could make any team that was there, so I had an opportunity to play all of the sports. As a small town, small school athlete I did just fine, and so I was ... I had an unrealistic expectation of my athletic abilities as I went into college.

I started college at Oglethorpe University, which at that point had a wonderful basketball program. They'd lost the year before in the quarter finals of the national tournament to Southern Illinois who had a wonderful team, and had an all pro who was playing point guard for them at the time. I stepped into that environment, and found out how high I couldn't jump, and how quick I was not. Had a lot of disappointment to deal with that first year, transferred to Georgia State a year later figuring that I had better get an education if I wasn't going to be able to be the professional athlete that I had aspired to be.

Started in actuarial science, because I thought actuaries made a lot of money, and found out that they made a lot of money for good reason. You had to be really really good at mathematics to do well there, and found out I was studying till 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning and going to class, and listening to people who had done the homework that I had spent all night doing, they had done while they were playing bridge. It struck me I was going to have to compete with those people for the rest of my life, and that probably wasn't a real good place to be. I decided I'd better get somewhere else. Tried management for a while, and that just seemed like common sense.

Took one accounting course, hated it. Just hated, and actually got into accounting because I hated it so much. It's just ... If that makes sense, there was a ... They had an experimental course that they were offering as the second basic course in accounting, and I thought anything had to be better than the first course I had been through. They had a professor who was on loan from Arthur Andersen, that was a partner of Arthur Andersen. He ended up as a head of the quantitative methods department at Georgia State, and he taught the accounting course in an entirely different way. It was business games, and gaming theory, and lots of interesting notions.

He encouraged me to major in accounting, and I said, "You can understand I hated the first course." He said, "Well profession is nothing like what you have been through in that first course in accounting. You need to really think about this, you could do okay in that environment," and so I took his advice and majored in accounting, and did okay through the curriculum. I thought it would be a good foundation to have, and a good way to prepare for whatever you ultimately decided you wanted to really do. The public accounting firms were recruiting when I graduated and they expressed some interest in me.

Again, I thought if I could get a CPA certificate it would be a nice thing to have as background, and could lead you to do a lot of things. Ended up attracted to Deloitte, and took a position with them. At that point in time it was pretty much an apprenticeship arrangement. When you went into public accounting they didn't pay you very much money at all. You worked for two years for very little money, got your CPA certificate, and then if they wanted to keep you they increased your pay to a reasonable level. If not, you went onto the next thing that you were going to do.

Unlike a lot of people who were disenchanted with their first year in public accounting, I loved it, it was enormous variety. You'd be in a bank one week, and then the next week you'd be working in an airplane factory, and I had not had a whole lot of exposure to business other than loading lumber in a lumber yard. All of this was just eye opening for me, and I really enjoyed it. I liked working with a lot of other young professionals, and for the thirty-seven years I stayed with Deloitte that was the thing that really attracted me most was the opportunity to continually work with bright capable high character people.

Every year you would bring in a new class of bright bushy tailed people who were just as smart if not smarter than the partners in the firm. You had this sense of refreshing that went on in the organization. To this day, many of my very best friends are friends that I developed through my career. I took a traditional career path in public accounting with Deloitte. I was in the audit practice, and I served some of our largest clients, and I'd been doing that for seven or eight years, and the managing partner of the office came to me and said that they were going to start a small business services practice, which was a service line focused on entrepreneurial kinds of companies that would be venture capital supported and the next big clients for the firm.

I had been getting an itch to try some managerial ideas. I didn't think that our firm was particularly well managed, and I thought we were being run off the playing field from a competitive standpoint. I had some ideas I wanted to try, so this was an opportunity to exercise some of those ideas and see if I could make anything happen. I got calls from all over the country from friends who said, "Have you lost your mind? You were serving the largest clients in your office, and if you just keep your nose clean for another couple of years you'll be a partner, be admitted to the firm, and be home free," but doing the same thing for another couple years just didn't really have very much appeal to me.

I've always been intellectually restless, and in fact, one of the reasons that I retired early was that the opportunity to do even the top job in the firm for another four or five years just ... You know I've been there done that, and it didn't have a tremendous amount of appeal. I had no problem taking the opportunity up, and I spent the next several years building that department. It was fairly successful, and after a couple years I made partner in that role, largely doing it by surrounding myself with really exceptional people.

Although, I didn't have an advanced degree, I had an undergraduate degree, everybody I brought in the department had a master’s degree. They were very high talented people or I didn't bring them into the group. As I say, I made partner in that department ... leading that department. The firm put us through a group of tests, psychological tests and things like that, and then we had a debriefing after that was over. This was after we had made partner so we wouldn't panic as if it being a threshold test or something. The psychologist said, "You say that you might have some interest someday in managing the firm, or being in a firm leadership position," and I said, "Yeah, sure."

He said, "But yet you say what you really enjoy doing is creating small groups of really talented people to accomplish aggressive exciting goals," and I said, "Yes, that's right." He said, "Well that profile sounds more like a commando leader than it does the general of an army," he said, "Deloitte's got thirty thousand people in the United States, it's an army this is not a commando unit." He said, "The great generals find a way to make the average person in the organization a little bit better." He said, "The great leaders of large numbers of people find ways to be successful, more successful than their competitors with the same kind of people, with average people."

That really struck home with me, and I recognize that that was a valid criticism. I don't know if it's true or not, but the story is that Napoleon, his great success criteria was that he was able to train his soldiers to march a little faster than the standard for European armies. To spite all of the conversations about his great marshals and everything else there are people that believe that his success is really attributable to training his troops to a higher standard, and that story really stuck with me as well. I have had for that reason a lifelong sense that a part of your responsibility as a leader of a large organization was to make the team better, and that you made the team better by training to a higher standard.

I think those two things, which I got really from education within the firm, had an enormous impact on me. I remember to this day going to new senior accountant school, which is after you've been with the firm for three years, and there was a professor from Temple there who was our instructor. He said ... I don't remember anything else he said but he said, "That no organization exceeds the expectations of its leadership." That wove in well with the other things that were an important part of my concepts of leadership. Was that leaders that have a high expectation of the organization, if you didn't have they weren't going to over achieve your expectations, and so you needed to set high goals for yourself and the organization.

Leading public accounting firms, law firms, things like that really a different leadership role, because you are leading a group of people who on average are very very talented, very very smart, very very talented. A command and control structure doesn't work very well, because they have options. I always said when I was partner in charge [inaudible 00:18:02] the Atlanta office I said, "That's a misnomer, because the talented people are the ones that are in charge. They can choose to vote with their feet the next day. Walk into another organization, get a job tomorrow and you can't replace them."

In a professional service environment you have to find ways to show a confluence of interest between the organization and the individual. If you can show the individual how doing what you want them to do for the organization will benefit not just the organization but will also benefit them, you're dealing with smart people, that makes sense to them and you can lead that way. One of the best places, I always thought, to learn to do that was in nonprofit organizations in the community. I started volunteering with the United Way and places like that because I thought we as an organization should be giving something back to the community. I'd been brought up that way, and I thought that was important.

After a couple of years, I concluded that I was the one that was really benefiting, because I was learning how to lead people that I had no ability to command. I didn't pay any of them, I didn't hire or fire any of them, so the only way that I could lead in that organization was again to create a confluence of interest between United Way for example, or [inaudible 00:19:30] Society or whatever the organization was, and that's show a confluence of interest between that organization and the individuals that you were trying to lead. That turned out to be just a great training ground not just for me, but for the other people in the organization.

About 1980, I was asked to become a managing partner of the Atlanta office, and I was thirty-seven years old. We had a bunch of other really young partners in the office, and we didn't have a clue of how to do what we'd just been assigned to do. We just started trying to figure it out together. We started ... This is where my ideas about multiple leaders and team leadership began to form, because it was obvious to me that people up and down in the organization were having a profound influence on our success. It certainly wasn't all coming from me, and we had the opportunity to learn from each other, figure it out as we went along.

When I took over we were number ten in the big eight in Atlanta. We were really small, and there were a couple of local firms even that were larger than we were. Three years later, that had really changed, and we were number three in the city at that point. More importantly, everybody was having fun, and we were really enjoying coming to work. We were out recruiting the larger firms in the marketplace, because we were creating this fun environment, I think, to work in. We decided we didn't want to lose that. We said, "We're not exactly sure what we got here, but we sure do like it," and so we started trying to write down what we referred to as our mission values, our mission vision and values statement.

What we aspired our working environment to be, and we were convinced that you could create the working environment that you wanted. In fact, if you didn't you got whatever developed and it was accidental, and needed to be intentional. Our notion was that if you had parts of your working environment you liked, you really needed to recognize what they were and you needed to protect it. To the extent that there were things that you didn't like you could change that, but you had to do it intentionally. You had to decide what you wanted the work environment to be, and then get on with doing it.

We put pencil to paper, and some of it was aspirational, it wasn't all that you can imagine no work environment's perfect, so there were pieces of it that we needed to change and wanted to change and got committed to change. That really got a lot of traction across the firm. That statement of vision and values became the basis for the cultural statement for Deloitte. Over a period of years other offices picked up the same document. Worked with it, modified it slightly, and then over time that because a foundation for the cultural development of our firm, and so we were really excited about that.

As the office became more successful I got moved into a regional managing partners role, and became responsible for the Southeast basically, and ultimately a vice chairman in the firm. Then in 1984, despite the progress that we had made, it was clear that there weren't going to be eight survivors among the big eight. We concluded that we needed to do a merger, and Pricewaterhouse came and knocked on the door and suggested that we do a merger with them. That was my first real involvement with high level national and international strategic activities.

We tried to work through the merger with that firm. It was approved in the United States, and it was vetoed by Pricewaterhouse in the UK, and so the merger fell apart. Pricewaterhouse was clearly the more dominate of the two partners in that proposed merger at that point in time, and so we were in a mess. We just had a failed merger, been rejected by the other firm in the UK, and we changed our leader globally and in the US, and had a new ... Mike Cook, who was my predecessor in the US firm became the CEO at that point.

We did a strategic plan, we changed our board, we changed our management committee. I became a member of both of those at that stage, and we really went to work on trying to become a lot more competitive than we had been in the past. We had good success with that in the United States. We did not have particularly good success with that globally, and in 1989 our UK partners came over and very politely put a gun to our head, and said that ... They were a very prominent firm in the UK and said, "That we needed to do a merger or else they were going to have to seek another association with a different firm."

There would be no replacement firm in the UK, so nothing even remotely close to what ... to our firm there. We really felt we had no choice, and strategically we had been moving in the direction anyway. We agreed to go into that process, and we settled on a merger with Touche Ross. The business press referred to that culturally as the merger of Madonna and Jimmy, or the marriage Madonna and Jimmy Steward. Deloitte was the Jimmy Stewart, Touche Ross was the Madonna part of the combination. It was a culturally different organization. Happily, both firms I think recognized that the other firm had something they needed.

Deloitte clearly recognized we needed more aggressiveness, and a little more street smarts than we had demonstrated in times past, and I think Touche Ross felt like that they needed the association with a large sophisticated clients, and the experience and history that Deloitte had in serving them. Despite the difference in culture the merger was enormously successful over time. The integration was not. We attempted to ... We lost our UK firm, although they wanted a merger. They had a firm in mind, and it wasn't Touche Ross. When we announced that we were going to do the merger with them, they had intended from the first for us to merger with Coopers & Lybrand, and so they merged with Coopers & Lybrand.

We ended up losing one of our two firms in the UK and the Netherlands and New Zealand, or not New Zealand in Australia, and a couple of other places, prominent places. It was not a good start for the merger, but business is a relative gain. You don't have to outrun the bear, you just have to outrun the other campers. Even though we didn't execute that merger perfectly, strategically it was a really really wise thing to have done, and over time it made us into a tremendously powerful firm. If you asked me today I would say that Deloitte is the largest professional service firm in the world. If you asked somebody from Pricewaterhouse Coopers they'd probably say they are.

It's a really close comparison today, but it's amazing to me still that we had the number seven and number eight firm in an industry merge, and emerge as the number one or number two firm in the industry. I don't know that's ever been done before in history, so it turned out to be a very good thing for us. From a leadership standpoint it did offer some challenges, because of the cultural differences I mentioned earlier. It was also ... In any merger there're just enormous tensions between the cultures of the two groups, the interest of the two groups. You don't have the history of trust and experience that you have in an organization where you've grown up for twenty or thirty years.

Being able to lead in that environment, lead both groups of partners in that environment was a tricky thing. At the end of the day trust turned out to be the turning point. You had to create an environment where your partners from ... No matter what their heritage was from either Deloitte or Touche, you had to have an environment that people would trust. We went through five years of merger integration, and coming out of that our two leaders, one from either firm had shared the responsibilities of leadership had worn thin with the partners, because had to make a lot of hard decisions.

I am sure partners from both sides wondered if their leader had properly represented their interest in the combination. A lot of difficult decisions to be made. We did it right in the middle of a recession, so there was a lot of downsizing that occurred. People had to be fired, people had to be released, and that creates hard feelings. Their ability to be reelected was called into question, and so I was approached by our nominating committee of partners and they said, "Would you ... We're not sure that we can elect our two current leaders, and would you consider running with another partner as an opposing slate?"

I said, "Absolutely not. That we have ... We're too fragile as an organization, and if we have a contested election at this stage it's likely to tear the firm apart." I said, "I would not do that," and they said, "Okay." They went away for a month, did some more interviews, came back and said, "Can't be elected." They said, "If you won't run against them, would you run with them?" Never even occurred to me, we had two leaders now we're going to have three, but that turned out to be the answer. I ended up part of a three man office of the chief executive. I was the managing partner, elected managing partner of the US firm. The other two members of the office of chief executive had different responsibilities.

One for our major clients and our public persona, and another for our international activities, each of us reported separately to the board of directors. If that sounds like a difficult managerial involvement it was, and there were lots of places where you rubbed up against each other, and probably not the ideal solution to have the unity of command doctrine violated that comprehensively, but we got through. Whatever difficulties we had we got through those and the firm was in fact successful over that five year period of time.

For me it was an exciting time. Had opportunities to try things and do things that we'd not had before. I introduced our first strategic plan to the partners, and at that point in time there was a concept around professional service firms, and it was known as the glass ceiling. The notion was that professional service firms could only make so much money. That at some point the business model just didn't work, and you couldn't get beyond that point, and we were roughly there. I thought that was absolute nonsense.

My strategic plan suggested that we would double our partner earnings ... average partner earnings over that five year period, and they laughed out loud at the partners meeting when I put that up on the screen. You got two thousand people out there, and I put the anticipated result from our strategies up on the screen, and they literally laughed out loud, but they liked the idea. We worked at it, and we hit our strategic or our earnings goal in four years, so they were happy with that. I'd like to take a lot of credit for that, but it was really in that wonderful period of time in the market when we were leading up to the tech bubble.

If you were a public accounting firm and you had people, you didn't have to do much selling. You just had to open the doors, and it was before the year 2000, so all the consultants were busy putting in new enterprise wide systems. You had opportunities with new rapidly growing companies because of the tech boom, and the real key to growth was your human resource practices. We had really focused on that as a key strategy. What we had done was we started with my predecessor's idea that we needed to understand and fix whatever was causing our firm not to be able to promote women partners.

We were bewildered by it, we looked at ... We'd been hiring fifty percent women for years and years and years, and yet when you got down to the promotion to partner time there weren't any women left. It wasn't that the process of partner selection was biased, because it just ... there weren't any women there to choose from. What happened was, even though there's a very small difference in the turnover rate among men and women over a ten year period, when you carried it out over that ten year period ... You had to understand for men it was ten percent a year, so there were only ten left out of a hundred when you got to the tenth year.

With a small difference for women it was worse. You ended up with virtually no women left in the management pool after ten years. There were lots and lots of reasons for that, but to make a long story short, most of the reasons were human resource reasons. They weren't female reasons, they weren't gender issues they were people issues. We focused on that hard and we said, "Okay, we got a chance here not just to make things better for our women in the organization, but we have a chance here to make things better for our people in the organization, and maybe to create a competitive advantage with our competitors."

Public accounting had probably the worst reputation for churn and burn of talented people that ... anything in business. We said, "Let's turn that around. Let's see if we can turn that around, and become a real magnet for talented people." We were able to significantly reduce our turnover rate among men and women. We started to be able to make women partners. We were able to attract and retain more talented people in the organization. When the economy took off, and we needed to attract even more people we were able to go to the other firms. We had positive switching statistics against every one of our competitors in terms of partners.

Our least successful comparison was a two to one advantage, so we took two partners from them, from every one partner they took. Our most successful was ten to one, where we took ten partners of theirs for every one they took from us. In a growing economy that was an enormous competitive advantage, because ... Not because we were good salesmen, but because we actually had to staff work. When a potential client came in we had people to do the work. We had one year in which we grew ... This is a hundred year old firm, and we grew thirty percent. In a mature industry having a growth rate of thirty percent is just phenomenal.

I wouldn't particularly want to go through that again, because it was a little like holding onto the back of a roller coaster as you were trying to recruit enough people and hire enough people to ... qualified people to do the work. That was an exciting time, and again, with all due credit to the economy we had five successful years, and at the end of that five years I was then elected CEO of the US firm and also of the global firm in ... that would have been 1999. There one of the big objectives was to try to find a way to consolidate or to integrate the practices around the world.

Public accounting firms do not own their affiliated organizations in other countries. It's not like a corporate organization where you would buy your subsidiary in France or in Japan, but rather it's more like a franchise. Where the individual countries are very very strong franchisees. They're very very strong, because there really are no substitutes for them, so if Deloitte for example, were to lose the Tohmatsu firm in Japan there's really no other substitute for that firm. While you theoretically can take the name down from the door from the franchisee, you don't have anybody else's door to put it up on. It creates a very very strong franchisee relationship with the global organization.

You have to accomplish those things by influence. You have no ... When I was CEO of the global organization I couldn't fire a secretary in France .. It was ... It would just ... You had to ask that things were done, and again find ways to find ways where the interest of the national practice coincided with the interest of the global firm, and that usually had to do with clients. If you were in Germany, and you had a first rate client that you wanted served ... That had subsidiaries in the United States, and you wanted it well served then you had best take care of the US clients that had subsidiaries in Germany. There was a strong reason for us to cooperate, but there was also a strong sense of national sovereignty.

The idea that we would create a global management team and a global governance vehicle, and that national sovereignty would actually be transferred to the global organization was not an easy sell. About the only way to do that was face to face with them creating a level of trust in the global leadership. That meant putting yourself on an airplane, and traveling about seventy-five percent of the time, and living with jet lag. Most of my meetings were a day or two, and then you were back on an airplane going somewhere else, and in a different time zone.

I just concluded I was never going to feel good as long as I was in that job. You don't realize how bad you're feeling until you get out of the job and aren't constantly jet lagged. That was the first assignment, was to try and bring the [inaudible 00:42:57] pieces of the global Deloitte organization into a common strategy, into a common management approach. Create as much of a one firm feeling and execution as you could while still maintaining the sovereignty of those national practices. Also, not exposing national practices to the US tort system, which was very important to those folks. They did not want to be in the US justice system.

I think every global CEO, and I always said in Deloitte has believed that they led the firm during the most difficult time in its history, and they're all right because things have just gotten progressively worse and more difficult. I guess for me there were two or three particularly difficult periods of time. One was September the 11th, and we had already ... The other coinciding difficult thing was the accounting scandals that were taking place at that point in time. It reminds you a little bit of today with the politicization of the investment bankers, and the bankers that you ... that we're seeing in senate hearings and things like that.

I had a wonderful opportunity to testify before the senate banking committee, and you saw politicians being very very critical of people in our profession. You had September 11th happening right in the middle of all of that, and I knew the character of the people in the organization that I was privileged to lead. I thought that it was a shame and a disgrace to have them castigated by politicians. Against all of the advice from our public relations [inaudible 00:45:19] we said, "Keep your head down. Be quiet, don't say anything." I felt like my job was to defend our people, and I was bound and determined to do that. The PR guys were right in the sense that it was like spitting into the wind.

It was this enormous political backlash against the profession just because there were a lot of accounting scandals at that point. It was very difficult to make any headway in the press or in interviews in things like that, but I was determined to try to do it. I gave, I have no idea how many interviews I did or trying to defend the people not just in our firm, but in the profession. About that time, of course, September 11 happens, and we had been in ... Our New York office had been in the World Trade Towers at the time of the first bombing.

Our people had walked down a hundred floors in pitch black smoke filled stairwells and they weren't going back, so we moved our New York offices into ... Unfortunately not very far, into the World Financial Center, which was across a couple of streets from the World Trade Tower. We were there when the terrorist attack occurred, and I talk about the culture of our organization, how much we had worked on that. Our human resource focus of our strategies and after those people ... First of all, destroyed our office in the World Financial Center, glass blown in things like that, but by that point we had better emergency plans and so all of our people got out fine there.

They walked the couple of miles I guess up to our midtown office. Covered in soot and ashes and everything else from the collapse of the building, and worked for as long as forty-eight hours straight on the telephones trying to be sure that all of our colleagues were accounted for. We were on ... I was on voicemail daily during that period of time with the people in the organization. We still have seventy people in the organization unaccounted for. We still have twenty-five people in the organization still unaccounted for, because we knew we had client service teams in the World Trade Tower.

We didn't know all of the Deloitte people that were in the New York area, because again people came in from all over the world to New York to work on their own clients. It took literally days for us to finally figure out that we had lost one person ... One person's life in the World Trade Towers. Again, I was so proud of our people what they did that day. One of our guys in our Connecticut office in one of our technical areas was a retired staff sergeant in the Marine Corps, and he put his uniform on and found a way to get back into Ground Zero.

You may have seen the movie, and he ... This was the point in which they pulled out all the first responders, because they were afraid the other buildings were going to collapse. The towers had already fallen, and they thought the other buildings around them were going to collapse. He talked a New York Police Lieutenant into going back into Ground Zero with him, and they went in looking for survivors. They found a little cave that had been created by the falling of girders, and it was about eighteen inches of hole there.

They found three people that were trapped in the hole. One man ... One or two of the people were caught under the girder, and so they dug their way into that hole, and worked for six hours trying to cut everybody loose. They finally ... they got two people out alive, and one person subsequently died, but they saved two people's lives. I would do interviews after that and I would say, "You know these are the kind of people that I work with, and these are the kind of people that politicians are questioning their character," and I said, "I can't stand it." It's just ... This is the stuff that these people are made out of, and they deserve more ... They deserve more respect than they're receiving. That was an interesting time to be leading the organization.

We were talking earlier about how leadership is dispersed, and that 9/11 experience was a great example of that. I was actually in Nashville the day that the Trade Towers were struck. I was about to go to Tulsa, and I was waiting in the airport. The flight was delayed and I said, "Well why is the flight delayed?" They said, "Well, a building's been hit by an airplane," and I said, "Well gee they must have had good aim if they hit a building in Tulsa." They said, "No, no the World Trade Center's been hit by a plane," and my first thought was terrorist attack. My second thought was thank God we got out of that building.

Then obviously got on the phone started trying to get to people in the office, and we had some of our partners who were there, and already stepping up to the leadership job of being sure that our people were accounted for. We had one partner who just on his own made a decision to buy eight hundred cell phones, and we probably owe that man more than we'll ever know, because that was the only way we really had to communicate with the three thousand people that we had in the World Financial Center.

At that point in time they had to go home, we had to find ways to communicate with them, and those eight hundred cell phones were just a God send at that point. So, there's a guy in the midst of a crisis that does exactly what he knows he ought to do. Doesn't worry about whether he can get reimbursed or not, he's making the right decision doing the right thing for the organization, and that's the kind of leadership up and down the organization that is required for an organization to really be successful.

We had tons of people like that that were practice unit leaders that took care of their people and got them organized, and got them ... Found a way to make them productive again in a short period of time. In a period of two weeks we were at about ninety-five percent of capacity again. Again, really wonderful leadership from people on the ground. Shortly after that, Andersen collapses as a result of the problems they were having with the justice department. I had known Joe Berardino, who was the CEO of Andersen, quite well and I like Joe, and we had had conversations before about potential merger, and we danced around each other.

Neither one of us really wanted to merge our firms. I'd been through it before, and didn't want to go through it again, and Joe wanted Andersen to be independent, but we both liked the other firm. We finally put our cards on the table and said, "Look, I don't really want to do a merger, but if anything happens and you're about to do a merger or we're about to do a merger we ought to talk." So we agreed we'd do that, and so in the midst of the scandals and everything else I get a phone call from Joe. He says, "Jim it looks like we may have to do something."

He said, "This problem that we're encountering is not going away, and it looks like we're going to have to do something." I said, "Well, we'd be happy to talk with you." We spent a week in a hotel in New York with about half the lawyers in the western world I think. Trying to figure out a way for us to do a global merger with Andersen, without having the liability that they were dragging transferred to our firm. We struggled with that, struggled with that, and struggled with that, and even at one point you may recall that Paul Volcker was the independent oversight person that was working with Andersen to try to help them through this difficult period.

Joe and I called Paul and said, "We're talking about doing a global merger," and I said, "I really don't think that's good public policy. We've only got five firms now, and if we merge with them there'll only be four," and I said, "I think that's really not the best answer." I said, "If it'd be possible for you and Arthur Levitt for example, who was then the head of the SEC, to go to congress and create a safe harbor for Andersen," I said, "We will withdraw from these conversations, because we're ... Really don't think this is a great idea, but otherwise we're going to move ahead." Mr. Volcker said that, "Politically impossible." He said, "At this point there's just no way," and so we went ahead with the conversation.

Tried to make it happen and just couldn't get ... Even Andersen’s lawyers finally agreed that there was no way to effect this transaction globally without carrying ... A lot of potential for carrying the liability through, so decided we couldn't do that. We had to attempt to negotiate mergers in every country around the world. We were reasonably successful with that. We ended up merging, I think, in twenty different countries, and pretty much split Andersen between Ernst & Young and Deloitte. I think Pricewaterhouse merged in china, and maybe KPMG in Australia I think, but ... and maybe a couple of other countries, but in the main the Andersen firm was divided between Deloitte and Ernst & Young.

It has been a terrific combination for Deloitte. I assume for the other firms as well, but for our firm it solved a lot of problems in specific countries where we didn't have the strength that we really needed to have. We got an enormous number of talented people as a part of that combination as well. It was just a bloody shame that a great firm like that ... Even when the courts overturned the verdict, of course, that was a [inaudible 00:57:58] victory because they were already gone. It was a sad thing for the profession. I think a sad thing for the public in many respects, but a great thing for Deloitte retrospectively.

Again, it was an interesting period of time, interesting several years. The opportunity for reelection comes up, and I'm looking at whether I want to do the same thing for another several years. For a lot of different reasons. My health was not good, I was not tolerating the travel particularly well. I had very young grandchildren, and I was really excited about watching them grow up. The saneness of the job had very little appeal to me. I've always ... Four or five years I'm ready to move on to the next thing, and throughout my career with Deloitte they were great about that.

People would say, "How many different jobs have you had?" I'd say, "Well, probably fifteen or twenty," I said, "But it's all with the same company." I've done ... I've had lots of opportunities to do different things, but always within Deloitte. For the first time there was really nothing left for me to do within Deloitte. They talked with me about perhaps doing the chairman's job, and splitting the chairman and CEO role, and I said, "That would make two people miserable. Me and my successor, because he would be worried about changing things with me sitting there, and I would be worried about him changing all of my perfect decisions. It's just not going to be a good situation for either one of us."

So, concluded we wouldn't do that, and I would go find other things to do, and the firm had been blessed with a lot of great leaders in the organization. It's been wonderful to see them perform since I left. It reconfirmed my own lack of confidence in my own abilities relative to the people that I was working with. They've done a marvelous job, and I went about figuring out what I was going to do with the rest of my life, and I took a position, an unpaid position I should say, with the US Chamber of Commerce as a senior fellow for corporate governance. I was really interested in board matters.

I took four corporate board positions with Coca-Cola Enterprises, and Time Warner Cable, and ConocoPhillips and Equifax, so that kept me off the streets. I did ... I had a couple of nonprofit boards. One in Atlanta was Voices for Georgia's Children, this was a startup advocacy organization for children's interest in the Atlanta area, and it was being fostered by United Way, so they asked me if I would help that organization get started. I didn't know anything about public policy issues, but I did know something about getting organizations started.

I served as chairman of that organization for four or five years, and then on a board for another couple years. Then it was time for people who knew what they were talking about ... They needed someone who understood public policy. I worked for years with a ... and still am on the board of The American Friends of the Phelophepa Train. Which is a clinic on rails that serves the remote regions of South Africa from a health care standpoint. They have an eye clinic on the train, they have a dispensary on the train. They have doctors and nurses on the train, and I made the mistake of going over there while I was still with the firm, and going out to visit the train.

People had walked for miles and miles and slept all night under the train, so they could get their only access to health care in the course of a couple of years, because the train makes a cycle through the various regions of South Africa on a once every two year basis. This was the only health care that those people, the older people particularly had access to, and it was just heartbreaking. I was hooked at that point, and helped to raise money for some period of time for that organization in New York. When I announced my retirement they said, "We want you to come over, and we want you to tour South Africa.

We're going to ... We're going to ... People we're going to take with you," and so I went over there out of politeness as much as anything. The first night we stayed in Johannesburg, and we had a suite that consumed the entire top floor of the hotel. It was unbelievable, and there was a butler who stayed in the room. It was totally uncomfortable for me, but he just stood there in the room, and just constantly upbeat and happy and he'd, "What are you going to do this morning Mr. Copeland?" I said, "Well, we're going to out and visit this thing called the Phelophepa Health Train," and he said, "I take my grandmother there every year."

He said, "I go out and collect her and her friends," and said, "And drive to wherever the train is going to be, and they get access to health care." From that moment on, there was nothing I could do that he wasn't involved in, that he didn't want to do for us. When I saw the way that the people there were reacting to that service, and the limited budget that they had. It was like two million dollars a year was their total costs for doctors and drugs and everything else that they provided.

We started doing an annual dinner in New York, and we raised about a half a million dollars a year in that exercise. I'm still on the board, I'm not longer the chairman. I asked ... One of the things you discover as you retire is that as you get older so does your Rolodex, and so the people that you're calling ... that you would normally pick up the phone and call for contributions are now retired also. It was well passed time for somebody else to take on that role, but I still enjoy my association with that organization, because I know it does a lot of good.

I was also at Georgia State as a global scholar, what they call a global scholar. I do whatever they ask me to do. I typically will do a few lectures a year for an MBA course or a class, and have great affection for the school. We're slowly but surely finding a chair there, between the firm and Patricia and I. Managing to find enough ... I'm teaching a Sunday school class again. Which was great, I did that for about twenty years before I moved to New York, and with the travel requirements there I really couldn't teach for the nine or ten years I was there.

It was great to get back, and start teaching the Bible again. I hadn't done that, and had missed doing that. Teaching a small couple's class now, and that takes a little time and thought. Having a great time with my grandkids, it's a wonderful decision to spend a few years with them while I still had decent health. As I look back on it I really have no regrets at all about the decision to retire early. Wouldn't take anything for the experience, but think I had the timing of exiting just about right.

Again, very few things that were pure gender, but they were things that impacted more heavily on women than men, because women are still principally the care givers at home. We ... Not having flexible work arrangements for example, was really really difficult for ... We would lose extraordinary talent, because we were unwilling to do anything other than the seventy hour a week during the peak seasons of work, and so ... Which are really stupid, because you couldn't replace people that had great knowledge and great expertise.

We started saying, "Okay, we're going to find a way to make this work." We would have people that were working part time, and that got some traction, but the thing that we did that really caused that to work was we made a couple of partners who were working on a part time basis. That went through the organization like you could not believe. There were issues around ... It was not a big issue, but there were occasional issues of sexual harassment, and those had to be dealt with. We had ... When I was ... I guess it was when I was managing partner, one of our partners was involved in inappropriate behavior. We disciplined him, allowed him to continue to work and there was a second incidence.

This was a guy who was one of the most productive partners in the firm. He was, at that point in time if you were producing twenty-five million dollars of revenue a year as a partner generating those kinds of revenues responsible for them, that was a big deal, and he was doing that. He was also a personal acquaintance of mine, and had worked with me. When all of that popped up the question of what are we going to do now comes up, and we fired him. Of course you can't announce something like that. You don't say so in so was involved in sexual harassment and now we fired him you can't do that, but it didn't matter.

That went through the organization in about nanosecond, and that did more to establish the fact that we were serious about men and women as colleagues, as we refer to it than anything else I can think of. There were a lot of things like that. Flexibility in work, making the work environment less hostile for both men and women. We had always talked about doing extraordinary things for our clients, and so we began to talk about doing extraordinary things for our people who do extraordinary things for our clients. I know it sounds hokey and trite, but we really did that.

We tried to do some ... If somebody made an exceptional effort around serving a client, they had a registration statement or something like that that required working all night for a couple of nights to make it successful, we tried to do something extraordinary for them as well. They had the sense that it wasn't an unbalanced equation. That we really were interested in our people. Promotion of women was really important. Women had to see that they were ... That they had real potential to advance, and we also discovered, and this was a gender specific thing, but it would have been true of men as well, that they needed a critical mass environment.

If you had a single woman in a tax department, her chances of success were not very good at all, but if she were one of five her chances went way up. She had role models, she had support groups, she had people who were accustomed to working with women, and that we didn't know. That was a new learning, and we just ... we became sensitive to the fact that our women had a very different view of the working environment than our men had. Including some of the few women partners who had been able to survive all of this. They spoke rather plainly about the working environment, and the guys were just shocked.

Sensitive bunch of men, and it was like hitting us in the face with a fish, but we made great progress. I give my predecessor much credit for having focused on that, and having led us to initiate that right in the teeth of merger integration and a recession and everything else. I wanted to take it to the next role or next level, so my objective was to go from women in the firm to women as leaders in the firm. What I wanted to do was to find ways to foster women leadership and female leadership in the firm.

I was really pleased when I retired the chairman that was elected was Sharon Allen, who is now finishing her second term as chairman of Deloitte, and I think the only female chairman of a major professional service firm. Terrific leader, just absolutely a terrific leader. There were a lot of things that we had to change. A few of them were gender specific, but most of them were things that everybody ... that affected everybody, but just simply affected women more heavily because they were playing two roles, both the care giver at home and also the professional at work. I think the thing that surprised us was that there were not more gender specific things.

We started off thinking they were all going home when they quit. That they were all going home to raise kids or something, and I mean we're brain dead. What we found out was, we did a little basic research, we found out that they were leaving, but they were leaving to go to work somewhere else. They weren't leaving to go home and take care of the family, they were going somewhere else. Well that really hurt, so we said, "We really have to think about how we change the environment, because we're hiring fifty percent women."

We had to make an argument to the partners about why to do this, because a partnership is not the birth place of political correctness let me tell you. You need a good hardnosed business reason to do something, and commence the partners to do something. What we finally settled on was we said, "Look, fifty years ago we hired a hundred men, and ten years later we promoted the ten best men to partner." He said, "Now we're hiring fifty men and fifty women, and ten years later we're promoting the ten best men to partner," said, "We are diluting our gene pool. We are degrading the quality of a partnership," and that sold.

They understood that. It was numeric, they could figure it out. We were taking the best one out of five, instead of the best one out of ten, and so we, "Okay, we got to fix this. We can't degrade the gene pool. We have to find a way to deal with that." As soon as they understood it in practical business terms then the deal was sold, and we got really good buy in from the partners, but to try and sell it on the notion that it's politically correct would have been a disaster, but they understood the business case and that was the reason I think for the initiative success.

Then of course once you get critical mass it takes care of itself. They work with them, they're dependent on them in teams, on each other in teams, and it was ... It began to take on a life of its own. Except in that boom period I was talking about. When we were growing at thirty percent a year. All of a sudden our statistics began to look worse. We had been tracking these diversity statistics, and they'd been looking great. Better every year, and then all of a sudden they started looking worse. I'm sitting there scratching my head, and I'm asking everybody what's the reason and they said, "Well it just doesn't make sense.

We're hiring the same number of ... if you look at the number of women we're adding and the number of men we're adding it's okay. The turnover ratio from year to year isn't changing." I said, "Wait a minute. Time out, this is a mathematical equation." I said, "It has to be in our advanced hiring where we're out in the experienced hires. The headhunters are going out and finding people." What had happened was, because of the growth of the practice in the years during which the tech companies were creating a bubble, prior to that we had hired eighty percent of our people off campus, and twenty percent from the experienced workforce. Well, in order to support the kind of growth that we were experiencing we had to have more experienced people more quickly.

We reversed those statistics, and we started employing eighty percent of the people from experienced workforce, and twenty percent off campus. What happened was, the headhunters were bringing us men, they weren't bringing us women. Once we focused on that we said, "Okay, wait a minute time out. Candidates have to be diverse, and so you bring us women candidates as well as men candidates." Then you see the statistics begin to pick up again, but it does point out how closely you have to watch. Even when things are going in the right direction, you get a change in circumstances and all of a sudden you have problem, so you have to pay attention.

Well, the joke was they didn't believe it. We had been making roughly the same amount of money for a gazillion years. The thought was that you just couldn't do better than that. Maybe for ... It'd been increasing for inflation or something, but the notion basically was that two hundred and fifty thousand dollars a partner was about as good ... Maybe three hundred thousand, but somewhere in that range was the glass ceiling. I mean we had our own consulting firm, and other consulting firms saying the same thing.

I'm sitting there looking at law firms that make a lot more than that, and other organizations make a lot more than that, and I'm saying, "That's just nonsense." So, we designed the strategy to change the business model, and to make the firm more profitable. Laid it out in this strategy, and of course the end slide says, "Okay, and here's the result of all of this stuff, is that we're going to double our earnings per partner in the next five years." They didn't believe it. They laughed out loud at me. It was ... and happily, we thought ... as a management team we thought it through pretty well. We were convinced it was absolutely doable.

As long as the economy held it was fairly easy to do actually. We got a lot of help from the volume growth in the economy, and we got a lot of help from the year 2000 issues, because the business community was panicked over their legacy systems that they had in place. We had done a great acquisition of an SAP based consulting firm. We had some really really wonderful people in our consulting practice. They had put together these industry profiles so they could quickly install SAP software, I mean or enterprise wide software in a company with the benefit of this industry profile that had been done beforehand. All of that just drove revenues in buckets. There was really no ... It really wasn't very difficult to double the profitability in that period of time.

That's one of the interesting things about the merger of Deloitte and Touche, because Touche Ross was basically a phenomena of post Second World War. They began basically to build their practice after the Second World War, as did Andersen. Andersen was also a post Second World War phenomena. The other big eight firms had longer histories, and two of the longer historied firms were Pricewaterhouse and Deloitte. Consequently, most of the Fortune 500 clients were already locked up as audit clients were already locked up by the other firms.

Touche Ross and Andersen basically built their practice by picking up the smaller rapidly growing new clients, and by selling consulting services to the audit clients of the other members of the big six. Andersen went through a systems consulting approach, and Touche Ross had built a terrific operations consulting group. They had come at it in different ways, but both of them had recognized that in the main, the huge big prestige clients were already locked up, so they needed to focus on what they could sell those clients that was not an audit, perfectly sensible strategy for both of them.

Our firm just ignored consulting in the main, and so we arrived at that period of time when consulting was such a wonderful opportunity, basically with no consulting firm. We had done a pretty nice job building a practice in Atlanta, I'll have to say, but most of the places in our firm we did not have a comparable practice to the big consulting practices, and Touche Ross had. That was another reason they looked good to us as a merger partner. We got another break in that Andersen by far owned the systems consulting practice, but they owned it on a custom design basis.

At about the time we completed and integrated the merger with Touche Ross, everybody started looking at are referred to as enterprise wide systems. Where the software is already designed and written, and the company's procedures were changed to fit the software. Under what Andersen had done, they designed custom software to fit the procedures for the company. Much slower, much more expensive, so a big change. We did an acquisition of an SAP specialist firm that was led by a German, and that put us in the systems business.

We had all these operational consultants already in place who could help the companies with the redesigning of their operations and procedures in order to fit the enterprise wide system. We had a chance to leap frog. A huge advantage that Andersen had in that particular market, and of course Andersen being a great firm they quickly converted from a custom approach to specializing in enterprise wide systems as well, but we had caught up. Not quite as large as they were, but we had a very very competitive practice, consulting practice at that point in time.

It's an interesting question and it evolved in an interesting way, but during that period of time I mentioned earlier that I thought our firm was just being out competed and that was part of it. They were much more strategic and intentional than we were. We were basically managing our practice in the 70s and the early 80s on a practice office basis. If you had a good managing partner who was aggressive and active in the market you did fine in that area, but it wasn't cohesive. There was no national strategy, no national operations consistency. We just weren't really competitive with the best of the big eight, big six, whatever at that point in time.

I would say it's not unusual. I think my case was extreme. You'll see that the more global a company is, and the more it is ... What's the best word ... Event oriented. For example, an oil and gas CEO I would say has to do that, because you're not really managing a static operation at a place. Maybe you are if you have a refinery or something like that, but if you're trying to work out leases with a sovereign government in Venezuela or wherever else the oil and gas happens to be, there's no substitute for being there and being in front of them, and in negotiating the deal. They want to see the leader, so in that kind of a company that would be the norm.

I would say in the more stable businesses it's more ... You have operations reviews that would be on cycle basis, and you have even driven appearances where something's going on that requires the leadership of the top guy in the organization. In those kind of companies I'd say the travel ... They certainly are involved in international travel, but probably not to the same extent as I was at that point in time. Had the integration of the global with the national practices been more mature, and better developed I would not have traveled as much.

Again, it would have been probably limited more to operations reviews and things like that, but we were trying to get people to give up their own authority voluntarily. That's a trust issue, just not going to happen without people knowing you, having confidence in you, and so you got to ... You can't do that by telephone it won't work. You just, you do what you need to do. One of my ... My successor did a great job of that in China. We had made the progress in China that we really needed to have made, and he focused on that. He, I have no idea how many miles he burned between New York and Beijing or Shanghai, but he spent an enormous amount of time there, and made great progress.

The position of our firm in China today is much stronger as a result of the time and effort that he spent there. It was much more around the strategic trust building, kind of influence peddling if you would with your partners abroad. Trying to get them to help you get done what you wanted to get done. It was really important to know what you didn't know. For example, we had a strategy that we wanted to get implemented, but getting it implemented in Japan ... I haven't got a clue.

I have no idea how you get that done, so what I did was I went to my Japanese partners and said, "You know this is our strategy, but I don't have a clue how to do this in Japan. Tell me, help me. How do we get this done in Japan?" They were wonderful partners, and so they would ... There were enormous cultural differences, and yet they were among the very best partners that we had. They would find a way to make very difficult things happen in the Japanese marketplace. I would never have been able to do it without relying on them to help me do it. I think a lot of people that get involved in international enter into it initially with a lot more hubris than they ought to have.

You find out very rapidly how ignorant you are of the depth of knowledge that's required to really be effective in a national practice. One of our ... Our German firm, had encountered ... Was involved in a fairly large lawsuit, and they were just panicked about it. Of course US partners were used to that, take a number, every day was another lawsuit, and it's part of being part of the US tort system. They kept getting just more and more frantic about it. I could not understand it. Could not understand why they were getting demanding and unreasonable, and these were really bright wonderful professionals, and so I finally looked at our general counsel and I said, "We're going to Germany.

We're going to sit down and find out what we don't understand." We went there, and we listened to them talk for about two hours, and finally one of them said, "You just don't understand." He said, "One of our partners can put us out of business tomorrow," and I said, "You're right. I don't understand, how can that happen?" He said, "Well, under German law," he said, "Given our organization structure, if one of our partners reports to one of the regulators that we are insolvent, and don't have the financial capacity to pay the claims under this lawsuit they can put us out of business that day."

I looked at our general counsel, and he looked at me and said, "Now we understand, we're going to panic too," because there's no replacement for ... again for our firm in Germany. Of course we solved it very quickly. We said, "Well what if the global organization, member firms were to stand good for ... Give you in essence a bond?" They said, "Well that would deal with it," and so we did it. I think they had no loss or a tiny loss in the settlement of the suit, but they were panicked and they were panicked for a good reason, one that we didn't understand, because we didn't understand German law at least at the depth that we needed to.

Things like that occurred daily. The issues that seemed to be irrational problems, and never were. When you've got bright intelligent partners acting irrationally you just don't understand. There's nothing wrong with them, the fact is you just don't understand what's going on there and countless times. We had this wonderful technology for auditing that we had invented, and it was terrifically efficient tool. We wanted to embed it in the global practice, not just for the efficiency, but as you know if you have ... If you control the technology you also control the methodology. That gave us a quality assurance tool.

We could be sure that the methodology feeding the technology was sound and high quality and gave us quality assurance. One of our Southeast Asian firms just rebelled and said, "We're not going to do it. We aren't going to do it." We said, "This is crazy. Why won't they do this? It's a cost saving, and plus it gives us quality improvement." We finally said, "Okay, we got to sit down and talk with them. There's something we don't understand." We said, "Okay, why don't you want to put in AS2, adopt AS2 throughout your practice?"

They said, "Well," they said, "A laptop computer loaded with AS2 costs about four thousand dollars," said, "And you say that's an efficiency tool and it'll make us more efficient," said, "A new employee costs us one thousand dollars a year," and so economically it was idiotic for them to agree to the ... So we said, "Okay, we really want the quality improvement. How about if we subsidize you for the cost of the computers," and then of course immediately they're reasonable, but again, it's just a case of you don't understand the economics on the ground in a small Southeast Asian country.

You have to be humble enough, and have your ego under control enough to listen to smart people when they talk to you about something that they know a heck of a lot more about than you do. You see, people new in global jobs make those same mistakes over and over again.

Well, I had great parents, and I grew up in a home where they gave me a religious and a spiritual foundation for the rest of my life, and it's driven my values for sixty-five years now. I had a sense that businesses ought to give something back to the community. I also had wonderful role models in Atlanta. The business leadership were just superb civic leaders also. One of the great things I missed about my work experience when I went to New York was that in Atlanta if you were not a really really rich person you could still be a part of the leadership of the community if you would volunteer your time and effort.

I can remember Larry Gellerstedt Junior, and [inaudible 01:36:24] Love putting their arm around me, even as I first started fooling in United Way. I was a thirty-seven year old managing partner and they said, "Don't," and I said, "Look I just don't have the money to ..." and they said, "Don't worry about that." They said, "Just work," they said, "You'll have a seat at the table," and they said, "We got this strategic planning project for the United Way we want you to lead." That was how I got into it, and I think just seeing that very successful business leaders modeling that for you had a big influence, and it tied right into the value system that my parents and my faith had given me.

That was a pretty easy thing to decide to do for altruistic reasons. The surprise was that there was also a wonderful career learning experience in it that I never anticipated, and I look at that and say, "Gee this is a lot like the same problems I have to deal with back at the office. Maybe if I can learn to deal with these successfully, I'll also be able to influence the people back in the office." It was just a wonderful training ground for leadership, and again I had great role models. Oz Nelson, just there was just tons of them.